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Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value

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Introduction

Professional environmental ethics arose directly out of the interest in the environment created by Earth Day in 1970. At that time many environmentalists, primarily because they had read Aldo Leopold's essay, "The Land Ethic," were convinced that the foundations of environmental problems were philosophical.[1] Moreover, these environmentalists were dissatisfied with the instrumental arguments based on human use and benefit – which they felt compelled to invoke in defense of nature – because they thought these arguments were part of the problem. Wanting to counter instrumental arguments in some way with non- or even anti-instrumental arguments, and unable to think of anything else to say, they began wistfully suggesting that perhaps nature had or ought to have rights.[2] When professional environmental ethics came into its own in the early 1980s, rights for nature were one of the first subjects to be debated in detail.[3] Unfortunately, however, no one could come up with a theory to support such rights attributions. Nevertheless, because rights had been invoked by environmentalists to challenge the preeminent role of instrumental value arguments, and because the field of environmental ethics developed in support of environmental concerns and arguments, environmental ethicists turned to an examination of noninstrumental or intrinsic value arguments for the preservation of nature.

As these investigations progressed, it soon became clear that most environmental ethicists, and indeed most environmentalists, did not believe that traditional intrinsic value – for example, the kind of intrinsic value which is attributed to art – was an adequate counter to instrumental value.[4] To find a kind of intrinsic value that could trump instrumental value – in the way that rights can – they started looking for nonanthropocentric intrinsic value. This search, unfortunately, has been a confusing one because of definitional problems with the word *nonanthropocentric*. A nonanthropocentric value was simply assumed to be the opposite of an instrumental value, making *anthropocentric* for all practical purposes a synonym for the word *instrumental*.[5] In environmental policy, there is perhaps some basis for such a definition, since nearly all arguments, economic and otherwise, are formulated routinely in terms of instrumental value to human beings. Nevertheless, *anthropocentric* is not and has never been a synonym for *instrumental*. It simply means "human-centered," and refers to a humanoriented perspective – seeing from the standpoint of a human being.[6] This confusion results from an assault on intrinsic value undertaken by pragmatists at the beginning of this century, who tried to eliminate intrinsic value talk and substitute instrumental value talk across the board. Although no one today can remember, let alone clearly formulate, the pragmatic reasons for abandoning intrinsic value, the idea that intrinsic value is an unnecessary concept has managed to trickle-down to the level of ordinary people, who now *believe* that only instrumental value arguments

work – but nevertheless *wish* that it were not so.[7] Moreover, the situation has been further aggravated by another even more widely believed corollary of logical positivism which has also successfully trickled-down – viz., the belief that all value judgments are meaningless, arbitrary, subjective, irrational expressions of emotion.[8]

There are actually two kinds of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory, an objectivist version of which Paul Taylor and Holmes Rolston, III are the most prominent proponents, and a subjectivist version proposed by J. Baird Callicott. In this essay, I discuss both objective and subjective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value in contrast to a counter-position, weak anthropocentric intrinsic value. I argue (1) that objectivist nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory requires and is complemented by weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, (2) that the most plausible version of subjectivist nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory is actually a form of weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, (3) that a weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory is superior to a weak anthropocentric value theory based on pragmatic instrumentalism, and (4) that most nonanthropocentric value theories are in various ways really anthropocentric.

Objectivist Nonanthropocentric Intrinsic Value Theory

Any examination of objective nonanthropocentric value should begin with an examination of its practical role in environmental ethics and indeed ethics in general. In the three periods of Western civilization, there have been two very different approaches to ethical decision making. The first is a virtue approach, according to which people are trained to develop good moral character on the assumption that moral persons will act morally. The second is a rule approach which aims at establishing a set of universal rules that are to be followed without deviation.[9] The former is the characteristic approach of the ancient and medieval periods, the latter of the modern period. As I have argued elsewhere, the effect, if not the intention, of the rule approach is to limit the range of ethical decision making, turning moral decision into either/or situations, in which following a rule, without regard to consequences, is what being ethical is all about.[10] This approach has gained support in the modern period because of "fear that the open form in which decisions naturally and normally take place will allow unscrupulous or weak moral agents to waver and modify principles to their own immoral advantage."[11] Efforts to establish unmodifiable universal rules for ethical decision-making usually come at the end of a period of emotivism – *Sturm und Drang* followed by Kantianism in the last century, and positivistic emotivism followed by prescriptivism in this century.[12]

The motivation behind the quest for an objective nonanthropocentric value theory seems to be of this kind, for objective intrinsic value is supposed to be independent of and override individual human judgment and the relative and evolving cultural ideals, which though currently supportive of nature preservation, might change leaving nature without moral defense. This concern is explicit in the writings of Paul Taylor, for example, who, citing Mark Sagoff's anthropocentric symbolic value theory, argues that he wants to develop a nonanthropocentric value theory because anthropocentric value is "entirely relative to culture: if a particular society did not hold ideals that could be symbolized in nature and wildlife (for example, if it happened to value plastic trees more than real ones), then . . . there would be no reason for that society to preserve nature or protect wildlife."[13] On analogy with the distinction between the basic rules of a game and rules of good play, I have distinguished between two kinds of rules, constitutive rules and nonconstitutive rules.[14] The first are rules which must be followed without deviation. Not doing so automatically produces an immoral act. The second are guides which may or may not be followed depending on specific circumstances in specific situations. Objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value is supposed to play a limiting role similar to that of constitutive rules. Recognition of the existence of these values in nature, independent of human judgment and culturally evolved values, putatively automatically triggers specific moral behavior.

Since the field of environmental ethics first began, environmental ethicists have always been very much aware that educated attitudes toward nature in the Middle Ages – according to which nature is not beautiful – would not have been supportive of twentieth-century-style environmental concern, and that it is possible that current

supportive values might change again.[15] This concern is also shared by most environmentalists. When I speak on behalf of weak anthropocentric value, I am frequently asked by environmentalists, "But what if people change their minds and stop thinking that nature is beautiful?" The possibility that our culturally evolved environmental values might change is, of course, a serious concern, given that these values, though derived from aesthetic tastes in art – primarily, from landscape painting, but also from nature poetry, landscape gardening, and natural history science – have now been out of fashion in art circles for more than a century. Nevertheless, although constitutive values might produce a trumping effect similar to rights for nature, if and when people ever come to be convinced that such values exist, I doubt that attempts to persuade ordinary people that such values exist independently in nature is a wise long-term environmentalist strategy. The best way, in my view, to deal with this concern is actively to defend these values as part of our cultural heritage, not to try to develop a metaphysical/epistemological theory of objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic values that constitutively trumps individual judgment and culturally evolved values. Defending these values as culturally derived values will focus attention on the merits of these values and presumably help strengthen them. In contrast, an objective nonanthropocentric value theory will draw attention away from their merits as cultural values (the point of the objectivist effort) and refocus it on metaphysical and epistemological issues that ordinary people are unlikely to understand or be persuaded by. While this approach might succeed for a time in freezing current values (by embedding them in our constitutive moral framework), it certainly cannot strengthen them (since they are supposed to be independent of human judgment and culture, humans should not be able to alter them one way or the other). In the event that aesthetic tastes toward nature do start to change (for example, "catching up" with those of modern art), a spirited defense of these values as cultural values might prevail. Whether an argument that these values are independent of and trump human judgment, and therefore cannot be changed, would succeed, however, seems less likely, given that ordinary people can easily refute the argument without providing any counterargument of their own simply by changing their values.

To be sure, there is a lot of room for legitimate nonanthropocentric value theory in environmental ethics, for most values, whether instrumental or intrinsic, *are* independent of human judgment. At the most general level, four kinds of values are possible: (1) nonanthropocentric instrumental value, (2) anthropocentric instrumental value, (3) nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, and (4) anthropocentric intrinsic value. In environmental matters nonanthropocentric instrumental values – concerning the instrumental relationships of benefit and harm between nonhuman plants and animals – are quite common and completely uncontroversial. Such values, which can easily be converted into facts, are indeed discovered in the world and are independent of human judgment. One thing in nature either instrumentally benefits other things or it does not, regardless of what humans think about it and whether or not humans even know that these instrumental relationships exist. Bambu is either instrumentally valuable to pandas or it is not. What we believe, know, and how we value it makes no difference. Anthropocentric instrumental value judgments, if they are simply the same relationships applied to humans, are likewise common and uncontroversial. Fluoride is either instrumentally valuable to humans or not, whether we humans know it, believe it, or value it. Even if *anthropocentric* is taken to require human judgment, producing judgments or beliefs that one thing is instrumentally valuable or harmful to another thing (human or otherwise) without adequate or complete factual evidence, such anthropocentric instrumental value judgments are also uncontroversial when they can be converted into the form of scientific hypotheses, making them potential or possible facts, and irrelevant (rather than controversial) when they are merely whimsical or irrational expressions of belief. Smoking tobacco is widely judged to be instrumentally harmful to human health, even though it is sometimes scientifically disputed by tobacco companies; in contrast, even though chicken-noodle soup is generally judged to be instrumentally beneficial to humans with colds, this judgment is not supported by medical evidence. Similarly, the basic nonanthropocentric maneuver, notably exemplified by Paul Taylor and Holmes Rolston, III – defining living organisms as centers of purpose in accordance with Aristotle's ends/means distinction – is also noncontroversial, if all that is claimed is that these entities have sakes or

goods of their own (independent of human interests) and that they are using nature instrumentally for the benefit of their own sakes, which are then defined as (intrinsically valuable) ends (to them).[16] Because such intrinsic value assignments are also a matter of discovery rather than judgment, they too can be treated as disguised facts – we can discover facts through scientific research that such and such kinds of organisms do or do not instrumentally use other parts of nature for their own ends. It is actually only anthropocentric intrinsic value assignments – judgments made by humans that such and such living and nonliving entities are noninstrumentally (intrinsically) valuable – that fully and truly depend upon human judgment, rather than mere discovery, and are not ever reducible to facts or scientific hypotheses.

There seem to be two basic reasons why objectivist nonanthropocentric value theorists object to doing away with or at least radically deemphasizing anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments. First, as noted above, they want values that operate much like constitutive rules in order to trump anthropocentric instrumental values. Second, they hold that there can only be (or should only be) one kind of intrinsic value.[17] It is this second reason which I find most problematic. Given that there are many kinds of instrumental value, nearly all of which have something to do with environmental ethics, it seems strange to me that anyone would want to claim that there can only be one kind of intrinsic value, or, if it is acknowledged that there may be more than one kind, that only one kind is relevant to environmental ethic.[18] It is almost as if there is a competition between various conceptions of intrinsic value such that recognition of one kind of intrinsic value, anthropocentric intrinsic value, somehow damages the other, nonanthropocentric intrinsic value. In opposition to this strange view, I want to argue here that anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments, rather than being in competition with nonanthropocentric intrinsic values, are absolutely essential if humans are to muster any environmental concern about nonhuman living centers of purpose (as well as many other natural entities) objectively existing out in the world.

Paul Taylor, a proponent of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, which he calls inherent worth, has made a noteworthy attempt to distinguish and separate nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric intrinsic value. After briefly mentioning instrumental value, commercial value, and merit or excellence, Taylor offers three kinds of intrinsic value: the immediately good, the intrinsically valued, and inherent worth. After defining (1) *instrumental value*, (2) *commercial value*, and (3) *merit or excellence*, none of which are important for the purposes of this paper, he defines (4) *the immediately good* as "any experience or activity of a conscious being which it finds to be enjoyable, satisfying, pleasant, or worthwhile in itself," noting that it "is sometimes called *intrinsic value*." He then provides two long definitions for (5) *the intrinsically valued* and (6) *inherent worth*, complete with examples, which I quote here in full:

> (5) *the intrinsically valued.* An entity is intrinsically valued in this sense only in relation to its being valued in a certain way by some human valuer. The entity may be a person, animal, or plant, a physical object, a place, or even a social practice. Any such entity is intrinsically valued insofar as some person cherishes it, holds it dear or precious, loves, admires, or appreciates it for what it is in itself, or so places intrinsic value on its existence. This value is independent of whatever instrumental or commercial value it might have. When something is intrinsically valued by someone, it is deemed by that person to be worthy of being preserved and protected because it is the particular thing that it is. Thus, the people of a society may place intrinsic value on a ceremonial occasion (the coronation of a king), on historically significant objects (the original Declaration of Independence) and places (the battlefield at Gettysburg), on ruins of ancient cultures (Stonehenge), on natural wonders (the Grand Canyon), and of course on works of art. Intrinsic value may also be placed on living things, which then are intrinsically valuable to (have intrinsic value for) the human valuers. A pet dog or cat, an endangered population of rare plants, or a whole wilderness area can be considered worth preserving for just what they are. Finally, anyone we love and care about has this kind of value for us. From a moral point of view, correlative with intrinsically valuing something is the recognition of a negative duty not to destroy, harm, damage, vandalize, or misuse the thing and a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged, vandalized, or misused by others.

> (6) *Inherent worth*. This is the value something has simply in virtue of the fact that it has a good of its own. To say that an entity has inherent worth is to say that its good (welfare, well-being) is deserving of the concern and consideration of all moral agents and that the realization of its good is something to be promoted or protected as an end in itself and for the sake of the being whose good it is. Since it is only with reference to living things, (humans, animals, or plants) that it makes sense to speak of promoting or protecting their well-being and of doing this for their sake, the class of entities having inherent worth is extensionally equivalent to the class of living beings.[19]

The immediately good, as Taylor defines it, is the product of an instrumental relationship between a "good" object and a human being exposed to it. As Taylor presents it here (rightly, I think), it does not involve human judgment, merely spontaneous emotional reaction to sensory events triggered by an external source. Taylor's discussion of the intrinsically valued is a good presentation of what I mean by anthropocentric intrinsic value – intrinsic value assigned or attributed by a human being or a group of human beings from an independent ahistorical human perspective or from a culturally dependent historical human perspective. Taylor's inherent worth is a fairly standard version of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value attributed to entities which have a sake, instrumentally use other parts of nature for their own intrinsic ends, or, as Taylor puts it, have goods of their own.

From my perspective, the key issue concerning Taylor's account of intrinsic value is whether the intrinsically valued and inherent worth can be radically separated. If they can't, then a creature having inherent worth or a good of its own is simply one of the various kinds of things that humans may, if they wish, collectively or individually, value intrinsically. Immediately following the definitions and discussions of the various kinds of values listed, Taylor writes:

> When a living thing is regarded as possessing inherent worth, it is seen to be the appropriate object of the moral attitude of respect. This kind of respect, "recognition respect," should not be confused with the attitudes of love, admiration, and appreciation directed toward entities that are intrinsically valued in sense (5) above.[20]

Two questions occur to me about these two sentences and the discussion that follows them. First, has Taylor shown that respecting something is different from intrinsically valuing it? At a minimum, Taylor has correctly pointed out that respect is different from love, admiration, and appreciation. One can respect one's enemies, for example, without loving them. He has, however, as far as I can determine, merely asserted, but not shown, that respect is something so different that it should not be placed together with love, admiration, and appreciation as a form of intrinsic valuing. Second, when "it is seen" (passive voice) that such and such an entity is "the appropriate object of respect," why does this not simply mean that some human decides to value this entity intrinsically – that is, by means of an act of judgment, attributes (active voice) intrinsic value to the thing in accordance with some personal or culturally derived standard? The use of the passive voice together with the introduction of the term *recognition respect* seems to suggest that there is no human value judgment involved – that the human simply "sees" or discovers that the entity has a good of its own, automatically triggering a feeling of respect analogous to the instrumental relationship characteristic of the immediately good.[21] Such an account of respect as automatic recognition bypassing human judgment seems to me to be implausible.

Consider the alien monsters of the films *Alien* and *Aliens*, which require the deaths of many other living creatures, indifferently including humans, in order to reproduce and survive as a species. The newly hatched alien monster emerges from its (his or her) egg and immediately enters a host organism, which it keeps alive and feeds on while continuing its development. When it no longer needs the host, it explodes out of the chest of the organism, killing the host with some fanfare. Up until this moment, the human host is conscious and aware of his or her situation. Because these creatures have goods of their own, according to Taylor, they have inherent worth. But does it follow from the fact that such a creature has a good of its own that we humans are *required*, in accordance with Taylor's definition of *inherent worth*, "to say that its good (welfare, well-being) is deserving of the concern and consideration of all

moral agents and that the realization of its good is something to be promoted or protected as an end in itself for the sake of the being whose good it is?" I think not. Rather, the (nonanthropocentric) inherent worth or good of its own of the alien monster produces a concern and consideration if and only if a human decides (or humans collectively decide) to intrinsically value the creature, thereby producing, in accordance with Taylor's definition of *the intrinsically valued*, "the recognition of a negative duty not to destroy, harm, damage, vandalize, or misuse the thing and a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged, vandalized, or misused by others." The circumstances under which the necessary anthropocentric intrinsic value attribution might be generated are fairly limited. First, the human and all other humans (and all other inappropriate potential hosts) would have to be safe from the organism (a point with which, I believe, Taylor would agree). Second, the creature would have to be in its natural ecosystem, rather than in some other ecosystem, where it would be regarded as an improper (and very destructive) pest. In the two films, two characters (an android and a human) do value alien monsters and try to preserve them, but they do so because of their instrumental value as military weapons (such creatures once released could presumably destroy all human life fairly easily, given the speed with which they are able to reproduce). It is true that humans might quickly develop a (healthy) respect for such creatures, but this respect would not be based on the recognition that these creatures have goods of their own, but rather would be out of fear, having recognized that the creatures are very dangerous.

Note that I am not claiming that a creature's good of its own is irrelevant to the moral concern of humans, merely that the fact that a particular creature has a good of its own is not enough automatically to produce moral behavior on behalf of the creature. After discovering that something has a good of its own, the human or humans must decide to intrinsically value it, and in doing so, the specter of cultural (and historical) relativity reappears, which was avoided by omitting mention of the need for intrinsic value attribution.

Note also that even though objectivist nonanthropocentrists are committed to doing away with anthropocentric intrinsic value, as an anthropocentrist, I have no similar desire to bring the quest for nonanthropocentric intrinsic value to an end. [I hold that "weak anthropocentrism" (the view, as I define it, that *anthropocentric* does not simply mean instrumental) can serve environmental ethics well until such time, if ever, that a convincing nonanthropocentric theory appears that will sweep strong and weak anthropocentrism aside.[22]] Moreover, I hold that whether the quest succeeds or fails, it will further enhance anthropocentric intrinsic value theory by providing new grounds for intrinsically valuing nonhuman life anthropocentrically. I confess, however, that I am not very optimistic that a nonanthropocentric theory will be successfully formulated, because the search for nonanthropocentric intrinsic value seems to me to be comparable to a Kantian search for actual objects in the noumenal world. To succeed, the nonanthropocentrists apparently need to go beyond valuing based on the human perspective – which seems impossible.

Note, finally, that even if a persuasive nonanthropocentric theory of intrinsic value can be constructed, environmentalists and environmental policy and decision makers will probably still need to make some anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments. Currently, nonanthropocentric theory, based as it is on the goods of individual organisms, leaves nonliving natural objects out of the moral account. As Taylor notes in his definition and discussion of inherent worth, cited above, the "class of entities having inherent worth is extensionally equivalent to the class of living beings." Thus, nonliving objects can only be defended on the grounds that they are instrumentally valuable to living centers of purpose that use them for their own intrinsically valuable ends.

Such an approach is, however, woefully inadequate with regard to the kinds of objects that I was principally interested in protecting when I undertook work in the field of environmental ethics – caves. Strictly speaking, caves are not objects at all. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein on pain, they are not a something but not a nothing either – that is, they are hollow spaces in layers of sediments. As a cave conservationist, I quickly learned that it is difficult to produce winning arguments to protect caves in terms of the creatures who live in them. Bats, worms, insects, and blind fish, though less distasteful than alien monsters, generate little preservationist concern or sympathy. Many people, for example, foolishly think that it would be a good idea for all bats to be killed on sight. The strongest

arguments for protecting caves, in contrast, depend upon the willingness of humans to act so as to preserve natural beauty, which in turn depends upon intrinsic valuing on the model of the aesthetic appreciation of art objects. As long as nonanthropocentric theorists concentrate on the class of living objects, nonliving beauty will continue to be left out, and will require anthropocentric intrinsic value attributions in order to receive any protection at all. Although protection of living organisms may require the partial abandonment of an anthropocentric perspective (to the degree that that may be possible), protection of nonliving objects requires a return to an anthropocentric perspective, unless these objects are to be valued instrumentally only. That approach, however, would run counter to our basic environmental intuitions and unnecessarily abandon very strong arguments for nature preservation, given that the historical/cultural foundations of environmental ethics (going back three hundred years) are primarily aesthetic.[23]

Because I consider my conception of intrinsic value to be (1) a necessary element in the valuing of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value and (2) complementary to nonanthropocentric valuing, since only anthropocentric intrinsic value can be applied to nonliving objects, I have no quarrel with the objectivist nonanthropocentrists and their quest as long as they do not insist that (1) only living entities with goods of their own matter morally and that (2) they matter in a way that is independent of human (anthropocentric) intrinsic valuing.

Accepting anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric value as complementary and interrelated, moreover, can even improve some objectivist nonanthropocentric theories. For example, Rolston's narrow focus on an organism's good ultimately denies a central role to natural beauty in his theory because natural beauty is too subjective to fit in comfortably with Rolston's desire to develop an objective approach. When Rolston finally reaches natural beauty in his book, he is only prepared to go through the motions of a discussion, and ultimately has little to say about it, because he can't effectively tie it into his objective theory: "With beauty we cross a threshold into a realm of higher value; the experience of beauty is something humans bring into the world."[24] According to Rolston, the value focus in natural systems is on the organism with its good of its own.[25] In this context, he divides the world up into beholders of value (humans) and holders of value (organisms with goods of their own), the value that the beholders behold. To find a way to include value beyond holders and beholders, Rolston adds value producers (the ecosystem) which provide (instrumental) support for organisms, the value holders. According to Rolston, the value produced by ecosystems, *systemic value*, flashes back and forth between instrumental and intrinsic value, on the model of particles and waves of light.[26] In addition, however, to maintain the dualism between holders and beholders, Rolston goes on to maintain that an ecosystem as a value producer is really a value holder "in the sense that it projects, conserves, elaborates value holders (organisms)."[27] When he finally turns to beauty directly, he addresses two fairly trivial questions, whether nothing in nature is beautiful and whether everything in nature is beautiful, and argues that the answer is somewhere in between, if we accept that the sublime is also beautiful.[28] The insignificant role of natural beauty in his theory, brought about by the quest for nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, is truly unfortunate, because, as is evident in virtually every sentence Rolston writes, no philosopher has a better feel for and appreciation of natural beauty than he does. To provide a place in his theory for his own aesthetic values, all that Rolston needs to do is simply to go beyond nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, defined in terms of the good of its own of an organism, and reintroduce anthropocentric intrinsic valuing into his theory. (This is advice that I also recommend to all other nonanthropocentrists who have pointlessly lost touch with natural beauty by trying to be too objective.)

Subjectivist Nonanthropocentric Intrinsic Value

Although there is only one prominent subjective nonanthropocentric value theorist, J. Baird Callicott, there are two theories. First, Callicott has argued that intrinsic value is conferred on the natural world by humans valuing it for itself. Second, he has flirted with the Self-realization approach of deep ecology, in which nature comes to have intrinsic value because a Self-realizing human becomes one with it. I deal with the Self-realization theory only in passing and focus my discussion on the first theory.

Callicott summarizes his Self-realization approach as follows:

> Now *if* we assume, (a)... that nature is one and continuous with self, and (b) that self-interested behavior has a prima facie claim to be at the same time rational behavior, then the central axiological problem of environmental ethics, the problem of intrinsic value in nature may be directly and simply solved. If quantum theory and ecology both imply in structurally similar ways in both the physical and organic domains of nature the continuity of self and nature, and *if* the self is intrinsically valuable, then nature is intrinsically valuable. If it is rational for me to act in my own interest, and I and nature are one, then it is rational for me to act in the best interest of nature.[29]

This approach is said to produce nonanthropocentric value, rather than anthropocentric value, because the human self is only a small part of nature as a whole, which is the Self with a capital *S*. Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation is available, according to which Self-realization is anthropocentric and nothing more than Cartesianism commandeered for environmental purposes. Note that nature acquires (or borrows) its intrinsic value from the human self, which is established on supposedly noncontroversial traditional grounds (the uncritical belief that humans have intrinsic value).[30] Seen in this way, the intrinsic value of nature is a product of the humanizing of nature, and the model is nineteenth-century idealism and solipsism, arising out of the Cartesian puzzle about whether humans can know that the world exists.[31] Because such humanizing is frequently considered one of the causes of our environmental problems, this approach is suspect.

Turning to the other theory, Callicott has also claimed that values depend entirely on human judgment – that there are no values in the world until they are imposed by humans: "Value is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, there would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right and wrong; only impassive phenomena would remain."[32] Nevertheless, Callicott insists that he can develop a nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory within this domain of humanly generated values, which he calls his "truncated" theory of intrinsic value:

> I concede that, from the point of view of scientific naturalism, the *source* of all value is human consciousness, but it by no means follows that the *locus* of all vaue is consciousness itself or a mode of consciousness like reason, pleasure, or knowledge. In other words, something may be valuable only because someone values it, but it may also be valued for itself, not for the sake of any subjective experience (pleasure, knowledge, aesthetic satisfaction, and so forth) it may afford the valuers. Value may be subjective and affective, but it is intentional, not self-referential. For example, a newborn infant is of value to its parents for its own sake as well as for the joy or any other experience it may afford them. In and of itself an infant child is as value-neutral as a stone or a hydrogen atom, considered in strict accordance with the subject-object/fact-value dichotomy of modern science. Yet we still may wish to say that a newborn infant is "intrinsically valuable" (even though its value depends, in the last analysis, on human consciousness) in order to distinguish the *noninstrumental* value it has for its parents, relatives, and the human community generally from its actual or potential instrumental value – the pleasure it gives its parents, the pride it affords its relatives, the contribution it makes to society, and so forth. In doing so, however, "intrinsic value" retains only half its traditional meaning. An intrinsically valuable thing on this reading is valuable *for* its own sake, *for* itself, but it is not valuable in itself, that is, completely independently of any consciousness, since no value can, in principle, from the point of view of classical normal science, be altogether independent of a valuing consciousness.[33]

According to Callicott, this view is nonanthropocentric, rather than anthropocentric, because human valuers (anthropogenically) value things other than themselves, and it is intrinsic, because human valuers value these other things for their own sakes. Nevertheless, it is truncated because although human valuers value things *for* themselves, nonhuman things are not valuable *in* themselves – because there is no objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value *in* nature.

Although there are a number of problems with this position, fairly minor adjustments could transform it into a weak anthropocentric position. First, it is a bit of an overstatement to claim that *all* value depends on the subjective feelings of *human* observers and that value does not exist in nature unless it is projected on it by human valuing. As I indicated at the beginning of this paper, there are many kinds of nonanthropocentric instrumental values that exist in nature independent of human judgment. In addition, I see no reason why Callicott should dismiss entirely the claim that nonhuman creatures have independent intrinsic value in the sense that they have goods of their own – that is, that they are ends instrumentally using their environment for their own sake. Problems arise with this kind of value only when it is declared to be the only kind of intrinsic value or the only kind that matters. Just as objectivist nonanthropocentrists need to acknowledge that human intrinsic valuing takes place and matters, subjectivist nonanthropocentrists need to acknowledge that nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, the good of its own of an organism, even though it exists independently of human valuing, is something that humans can (whenever they so choose) value for its own sake. Finally, I question whether humans are the only beings who value nature. Given that Callicott accepts a Darwinian evolutionary approach, it seems strange that he *sometimes* suggests that while humans can value (like or dislike, for example) some parts of nature, nonhumans cannot.

Second, I find it questionable whether Callicott's subjectivist position should be called nonanthropocentric. If it is true that "the *source* of all values is human consciousness" and that value "is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers," then all value (both instrumental and intrinsic) is centered *in* humans and radiates outward from humans *onto* things in nature. Given that I believe that other creatures also sometimes value (both instrumentally and intrinsically), Callicott's position is, in my terminology, a slightly stronger (weak) anthropocentrism than my own. For him to insist that his position is nonanthropocentric creates unnecessary and pointless confusion.

Third, I consider Callicott's position to be overly subjective. As I have argued elsewhere, human values are not entirely dependent upon the arbitrary value preferences of individuals.[34] In an Aristotelian sense, there are cultural values that are the product of social evolution. These values are not entirely subjective. At any given moment in the history of a particular society they can be objectively identified and described. Moreover, in most cases they are the foundation for the values of individual people. It is no accident that nearly all people in a particular society share the same values. They pick them up as children without formal teaching. They are the context and starting point out of which individual differences develop. Simply to call these social values subjective misrepresents their very substantial objective character.

Pragmatic Instrumentalism

The most serious attack on anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, and indeed intrinsic value in general, comes from the pragmatic instrumentalists, who like the turn-of-the-century pragmatists mentioned at the beginning of this paper want to convert such values into instrumental terms.[35] Rather curiously my chief quarrel is with my fellow weak anthropocentrist, Bryan Norton.[36] His arguments for denying that humans can (or should?) make anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments seem to be (1) that ordinary people find the word *intrinsic* confusing because it sounds mystical and (2) that presenting anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments in instrumental terms simplifies value theory, making ethics easier for ordinary people to understand.

Concerning the second claim, while I do not deny that it is certainly possible to simplify value theory in this way, most environmentalists, as noted above, have been unwilling to accept this simplification because they find instrumental presentations of noninstrumental values inappropriate and demeaning (to the natural entity), as evidenced, for example, by the fact that they still want a rights theory for nature.[37] When an aesthetic intrinsic value judgment is converted into instrumental terms, the person having the aesthetic experience is depicted as using natural scenery as a trigger for feelings of pleasure. When these feelings of pleasure are then compared with the other instrumental values that can be obtained, for example, by clear-cutting or strip-mining, the value of the aesthetic experience then appears trivial, ridiculous, and indeed indefensible.[38] In short, anthropocentric instrumental scientific and

aesthetic values fail to mimic the desired trumping effect of rights theory over basic instrumental values because they are treated either as questionable or inferior instrumental values.

With regard to the first claim, people are confused about intrinsic value only because they have become disoriented by the trickle-down effect of the pragmatic instrumentalist attack on intrinsic value at the beginning of this century. Before pragmatism created the confusion about the relationship of intrinsic and instrumental value, the distinction was clear and serviceable to ordinary people. The confusion caused by the blurring of this distinction is, therefore, not adequate grounds for continuing the confusion by insisting on the pragmatic instrumentalist conversion of intrinsic value into instrumental value in opposition to the clear calls by environmentalists, policy makers, and the general public for a return to intrinsic value theory. Norton has provided no evidence that we have reached a point of no return. Quite to the contrary, the dissatisfaction with instrumental arguments among environmentalists, policy makers, and the general public suggests that a return to straightforward intrinsic value talk is probably the easiest solution.

The way Norton converts intrinsic value into instrumental value is itself very confusing and, I believe, limited. According to Norton, natural objects should be valued because they have *transformative value* – value which transforms humans or changes their lives. As far as I am able to tell, this transformative value is similar to, and perhaps a general label for, what Rolston means by "character building value," "therapeutic value," and "religious value."[39] If it is, then it is too limited as a replacement for anthropocentric intrinsic value, for I do not see that the intrinsic valuing of some natural object necessarily involves an instrumental transformation of the human triggered by the object valued. Many intrinsic value attributions in art, for example, depend upon the application of historical aesthetic standards that at various times go out of fashion and, as a result, no longer move viewers emotionally (transform their lives). Although it is universally agreed that the Mona Lisa is worthy of being intrinsically valued, many, indeed, most people have no idea why it is considered to be such a valuable painting, and, lacking detailed training in the history of art, are not transformed by it when they see it. Should we say that it continues to be valuable because it once transformed people's lives and perhaps has the potential to do so again? If the value of the Mona Lisa were calculated in such terms, I think the concern of the nonanthropocentrists about the cultural relativity of anthropocentric value judgments would be justified. In real life, however, the value of a painting does not depend on the occurrence of particular emotional experiences in the general public. Rather it depends on the judgment of experts who interpret social ideals – the equivalent of the perception of Aristotle's "good man." Precise aesthetic judgments, comparable to those provided by art critics, can also be obtained by consulting professional nature interpreters, naturalists, and most environmentalists.

In practice, there is nothing confusing (or mystical or metaphysical) about anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments. Consider the value of an ornamental knife, made of precious metals and covered with jewels. Because the knife can function as a knife, it has the normal instrumental value that any other knife would have, not simply potentially, but also actually. Nevertheless, because the knife is beautiful, the judgment of the owner and others who take time to consider the matter will likely be that it is too beautiful (or good) to use (assuming that using the knife will mar its beauty). This judgment, to value the knife for its beauty, rather than its use, involves no confusing detours into metaphysics or mysticism. All that is required is an act of judgment. An individual or group of individuals or a society decides. In real life, it does not even require a defense. We do not customarily begin an instrumental argument with a general defense of instrumental arguments – for example, that instrumental value exists. We simply present the instrumental argument within the implicit framework in which such arguments are generally acceptable. The same is true of anthropocentric intrinsic value arguments. We do not need to begin such an argument with a proof that intrinsic value exists, for the existence of this kind of intrinsic value is not an issue. This kind of intrinsic value is the product of human valuing, human decision making, and everyone already knows what valuing, deciding, and judging means. The issue in such an argument is not the mental process (or the metaphysical status of the value produced), but whether the value judgment is an appropriate one – that is, in accordance with recognized social standards and ideals. The person who decides that the knife should not be used

will not justify his judgment by claiming that the knife is intrinsically valuable, but rather by pointing out that the knife is beautiful. Talk about intrinsic value will occur only if someone chooses to claim that beauty is itself a use (an instrumental value), invoking the pragmatic instrumentalist maneuver. At this point, the answer could be a nonanthropocentric excursion into metaphysics; however, a simple reminder that humans are fully capable of valuing things noninstrumentally and have been doing so for thousands of years is really all that is needed.

The reintroduction of anthropocentric intrinsic value judgments is not only a simple matter, but also a very useful one. As I indicated above, the reduction of intrinsic value to instrumental terms demeans and trivializes it, giving a counterintuitive advantage to (instrumental) resource exploitation by turning nature preservation into a peculiar, and largely indefensible, special case of resource exploitation and consumption. Maintaining the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, in contrast, allows us to set certain things aside and exempt them from use. Because the instrumentalist approach to valuing natural objects is the primary approach in economics, the valuable contribution that can be made by an intrinsic value approach has been neglected. In the nineteenth century, nevertheless, newly formed national parks were valued in two ways – in terms of their use as sources of raw materials and in terms of their intrinsic value as aesthetically and scientifically interesting collections of natural object. Proponents of these parks argued that these geographical areas, though instrumentally worthless (Yellowstone was said to have no minerals worth extracting and to be unsuited for agriculture), were priceless (off the monetary scale) aesthetically and scientifically. In these arguments, intrinsic and instrumental values were juxtaposed against each other as competing perspectives, both of which could to some degree be expressed in economic terms. Interestingly, however, arguments in terms of intrinsic value were always estimated in extreme terms – the natural objects were declared to be priceless, or off the economic scale, too valuable for any reasonable price to be set upon them. What we have here is an attempt to produce the trumping effect of the rights for nature arguments of the twentieth century, without corresponding theoretical problems. All that is being said is that these areas are valuable in a noninstrumental way, such that they should be removed from the market system, specifically, instrumental resource exploitation. The judgmental process is identical to the one that excludes the ornamental knife from use. In effect, the assignment of aesthetic and scientific intrinsic value to these natural areas is an attempt to give them the status of economic externalities, providing a useful tie with standard economic valuational theory. The public incurs the social costs involved in not exploiting these natural areas in much the same way that it incurs the social costs involved in exploiting other parts of nature – for example, covering the cost of pollution not included directly in the cost of the manufacturing of specific products.[40]

In part, to be sure, the high economic valuations (that they are priceless) are sometimes produced, as a matter of strategy (when the valuations are inflated), to override any possible instrumental argument. Nevertheless, they generally reflect people's basic evaluational intuitions, and can usually be justified (provided they are in accordance with social standards and ideals) on the grounds that their economic value (from an aesthetic/scientific intrinsic value perspective), though high, is indeterminate and speculative, given that the routine economic transactions that determine worth in the market system do not occur (or at least seldom occur) with regard to natural objects.[41] Recent sales of houses in a particular area, for example, largely determine the value of houses in future sales. Because natural areas (and species) are not bought and sold like houses on an everyday basis, their value cannot be determined in this way. To come close to this kind of valuing, we have to ask ordinary people to engage in contrary-to-fact thought experiments in which they imagine what dollar values might be assigned if natural areas and species were bought and sold like houses and if there actually were large numbers of humans who traded in them on a regular (and quotable) basis. This problem is analogous to the problem of determining the value of paintings and other art objects, most of which are also not bought and sold in the marketplace (having been removed from the market system by being placed in publicly supported museums). The value of the Mona Lisa, though very high (essentially priceless), is indeterminate and speculative because there is nothing comparable to housing sales to bracket the price range, which is another way of saying that the Mona Lisa, and similar paintings, are

external to the market system that determines the value of less highly valued paintings and reproductions. Note that this valuing is not mystical or confusing. It clearly reflects our desire as individuals, as a society, and as a historically evolved culture to value some things noninstrumentally and to set them aside and protect them from exploitation. It is justified by the fact that the valuational methods of the market system are designed to provide values for things that are in the market and subject to market forces, not for things that have been removed from the market and are, therefore, external to it.

Anthropocentrism Revisited

I have used the term *weak anthropocentrism*, rather than simply *anthropocentrism*, in the title of this paper to help call attention to the fact that not all anthropocentric valuing is instrumental. Without the addition of the word *weak*, no doubt many nonanthropocentrists would probably conclude that the title contained a typographical error or was a contradiction in terms: "instrumental intrinsic value." While I do not think that labels are important, it is useful to call the view I represent weak anthropocentrism at least until it becomes generally recognized that anthropocentrism does not imply instrumentalism. I do not think that it is possible for humans to avoid being anthropocentric, given that whatever we humans value will always be from a human (or anthropocentric) point of view. Even when we try to imagine what it might be like to have the point of view of (or be) a bat, a tree, or a mountain, in my view, we are still looking at the world anthropocentrically – the way a human imagines that a nonhuman might look at the world.

This kind of anthropocentrism, as I noted above, is built into Callicott's anthropogenic position that "the *source* of all value is human consciousness" and Rolston's aesthetic position that "the experience of beauty is something that humans bring into the world."[42] Although Rolston tries to deemphasize such human values, covering beauty almost as an afterthought after elaborately developing his nonanthropocentric value theory, these values do play a major role in his environmental ethics. For example, as Rolston acknowledges at the end of his chapter on the objective intrinsic value of organisms, the good of human (anthropocentric) aesthetic appreciation can easily override the good of its own of a wildflower:

> the goods preserved by the human destruction of plants must outweigh the goods of the organisms destroyed; thus, to be justified in picking flowers for a bouquet one would have to judge correctly that the aesthetic appreciation of the bouquet outweighed the goods of the flowers destroyed. One might pluck flowers for a bouquet but refuse to uproot the whole plant, or pick common flowers (daisies) and refuse to pick rare ones (trailing arbutus) or those that reproduce slowly (wild orchids).[43]

In this example, the deciding factors are purely anthropocentric: the human is the judge and the issue is the amount of aesthetic pleasure the human believes he or she will receive by destroying the nonanthropocentric good of the plant.

Rolston's nonanthropocentrism is also infected with anthropocentrism in an even more fundamental sense, for he argues, against the biocentrism of Taylor, that humans are superior to the rest of nature and deserve special consideration, a *strong* anthropocentric claim.[44] The practical effect of this position is an anthropocentric point of view in which humans receive special or superior attention because of their special or superior status. Rolston's arguments that nonhuman organisms have nonanthropocentric goods of their own have no *practical* impact on this anthropocentrism, which retains its traditionally anthropocentric character, as a kind of stewardship, rather than as a form of dominion.[45] (It is probably because humans are superior to wildflowers that picking the latter for the aesthetic enjoyment of the former can be justified.)

The term *nonanthropocentric intrinsic value* is really more problematic than the term *anthropocentric intrinsic value*, for the former comes very close to being redundant. The word *intrinsic*, which here is supposed to mean "for its own sake," clearly distinguishes the value of the valuable thing from the value of the valuer, indicating that the value is tied to the sake of the thing said to be intrinsically valued, not to the sake of the valuer. At best, the word *nonanthropocentric*, which is supposed to refer to value that is not human centered and independent of human judgment, merely asserts that the value of the thing valued does not derive its value from the value of a human valuer, a point already

made more generally (with regard to any valuer) by the term *intrinsic*. If we come to accept, as I have argued above, that most values are independent of human judgment, and that when we do value, we value necessarily from a human perspective but not necessarily in terms of human instrumental interests, then the term *intrinsic value* (referring both to intrinsic value conferred through human judgment and intrinsic value defined as the goods of their own of living organisms), will make the terms *non-anthropocentric* and *anthropocentric* unnecessary.

Notes

1 Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 209–10.

2 There are two references to rights of nature in Aldo Leopold's "The Land Ethic," *Sand County Almanac*, pp. 204, 211. Environmentalists were also influenced by Christopher Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects* (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman, 1972), which, though not focused on moral rights for nature, left open the possibility. This book was inspired by and associated with a Supreme Court case involving a wilderness area called Mineral King in California, in which Justice William O. Douglas, in a minority opinion, suggested rights for natural areas, citing Stone's views (reprinted in the appendix of Stone's book, pp. 73–87). Because animal liberation and environmental ethics were ambiguously interrelated in the early seventies, calls for rights for domestic animals were also frequently considered to be calls for rights for nature. Rights for animals were being championed at that time by Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals* (New York: New York Review/Random House, 1975), although Singer later declared that his rights view was inessential to his position in "The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals," *Ethics*, 88 (1978), 122. I first heard an environmentalist suggest that a river, the Meramec River, south of St. Louis, had rights in 1972. Rights talk was so common among environmentlists by the mid-seventies that John Passmore considered it to be the basic preservationist position. See John Passmore, *Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions* (London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 115–17. See also Norman Myers, *The Sinking Ark* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 46; David Ehrenfeld, *The Arrogance of Humanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 207–9; Paul and Anne Ehrlich, *Extinction* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 48. For detailed discussion of people holding this view at the movement level, see Roderick Frazier Nash, *The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).

3 Discussion of rights for nature was a basic theme of many issues of *Environmental Ethics* in the first five years. See especially Charles Hartshorne, "The Rights of the Subhuman World," *Environmental Ethics*, 1 (1979), 49–60; Richard A. Watson, "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature," *Environmental Ethics*, 1 (1979), 99–129; Roland C. Clement, "Watson's Reciprocity of Rights and Duties," *Environmental Ethics*, 1 (1979), 353–5; Anthony Povilitis, "On Assigning Rights to Animals and Nature," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980), 67–71; Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrong," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980), 99–100; Meredith Williams, "Rights, Interests, and Moral Equality," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980), 149–61; Jay E. Kantor, "The 'Interests' of Natural Objects," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980), 163–71; James E. Scarff, "Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980), 241–79; J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," *Environmental Ethics*, 2 (1980) 311–38; Scott Lehmann, "Do Wildernesses Have Rights?", *Environmental Ethics*, 3 (1981), 167–71; Edward Johnson, "Animal Liberation versus the Land Ethic," *Environmental Ethics*, 3 (1981), 265–73; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights," *Environmental Ethics*, 4 (1982), 17–36; George S. Cave, "Animals, Heidegger, and the Right to Life," *Environmental Ethics*, 4 (1982), 249–54; Steve F. Sapontzis, "The Moral Significance of Interests," *Environmental Ethics*, 4 (1982), 345–58; Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," *Environmental Ethics*, 5 (1983), 133–54; Louis G. Lombardi, "Inherent Worth, Respect, and Rights," *Environmental Ethics*, 5 (1983), 257–70; Peter Miller, "Do Animals Have Interests Worthy of Our Moral Interest?" *Environmental Ethics*, 5 (1983), 319–33. According to Roderick Nash (*The Rights of Nature*), rights for nature is still the dominate view in environmental ethics.

4 For example, according to Samuel Alexander, beauty, whether artistic or natural, is contemplated for its own sake – that is, is regarded as being intrinsically valuable. Samuel Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1933), pp. 13–14. The idea that art objects are intrinsically valuable is so well established that it was seldom overtly expressed. It appears primarily in analogies extending intrinsic value from art to nature and in contrasts of intrinsic value with instrumental and utilitarian value. See, for example, Thomas Cole, "Essay on American Scenery," in John W. McCoubrey, ed., *American Art: 1700–1960* (Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 99–100. According to Emerson, "art aims at beauty as an end," that is, as an intrinsic rather than an instrumental value, and beauty, both in nature and in art, gives us delight *in and for itself*. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Thoughts on Art," in McCoubrey, *American Art*, p. 76, and "Nature," in *The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. 9. At the beginning of this century, G. E. Moore argued that things that are beautiful in art and nature are good for their own sakes and "the proper appreciation of a beautiful object is a good thing in itself" and he compared landscape paintings with natural landscapes. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903), pp. 188–9. In accordance with this tradition, Aldo Leopold draws similar comparisons in "The Conservation Esthetic," in *Sand County Almanac*, p. 168, and "Means and Ends in Wild Life Management," *Environmental Ethics*, 12 (1990), 330.

5 Although this definition is implicit in virtually all the writings of the deep ecologists, it has been explicitly stated by J. Baird Callicott (who is not a deep ecologist): "An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which may serve human beings. A non-anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings." J. Baird Callicott, "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 21 (1984), 299.

6 See Henryk Skolimowski, "The Dogma of Anti-Anthropocentrism and Ecophilosophy," *Environmental Ethics*, 6 (1984), 283–8.

7 See, for example, Monroe Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," in Monroe Beardsley, *The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays*, ed. Michael J. Wren and Donald M. Callen (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1982). After applauding Dewey's attack on intrinsic value and adding arguments of his own, Beardsley admits in his concluding remarks that he himself finds Dewey's attack confusing: "I am always frustrated in reading Dewey, trying to separate the enormously good points from the confusing ones. Much of Dewey's famous attack on intrinsic value is really concerned with something else, namely ends-in-themselves (as opposed to ends-in-view). What he really exposes over and over again is the danger of fixing goals without reasonable regard to their means and consequences, and he is convinced that the belief in intrinsic value fosters this fixation, with its attendant train of ills: fanaticism, utopianism, opportunism, and the rest. Of course, it does not logically follow that if there are intrinsically valuable things, then there are necessarily ends-in-themselves" (p. 63). Other frustrations and confusions are not difficult to find. For example, in speaking of the consummatory phase of experience (happily, consummation, not consumption), Dewey warns against "the joys of egotistic success" replacing "the fulfillment of an experience for its own sake." He then claims to solve this problem by expanding the definition of "instrumental" (his quotation marks) to cover such matters – scolding, in passing, "persons who draw back at the mention of 'instrumental' in connection with art" (that is, who hold that aesthetic experiences involve intrinsic value, not just expanded instrumental value). He fails, however, fully to explain how the quotation marks take care of the problem of intrinsic value. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), p. 139. Amazingly, Beardsley discusses Dewey's attack on intrinsic value without ever bothering to cite any book or essay by Dewey on the subject, leaving uninformed and skeptical readers like myself no opportunity to judge for themselves whether or not the attack was truly successful. The difficulties involved in finding and unscrambling Dewey's attack suggest that it was more an ideological pronouncement than a real argument.

8 See A. J. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics and Theology," in *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), pp. 102–20.

9 See Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd edn. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

10 Eugene C. Hargrove, "The Role of Rules in Ethical Decision Making," *Inquiry*, 28 (1985), 3–42.

11 Ibid., p. 26.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

13 See, for example, Paul W. Taylor, "Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?", *Environmental Ethics*, 6 (1984), 151, n5.

14 Hargrove, "Role of Rules," pp. 10–11. I go on to argue that the treatment of nonconstitutive rules in a constitutive manner in chess and ethics limits a player's or moral agent's perception (in an Aristotelian sense), causing the player to miss winning opportunities and the moral agent to overlook important aspects of and solutions to moral problems (pp. 18–23).

15 As John Passmore once noted, in criticism of environmental ethics theory in general, "It is a considerable presumption, indeed, that our descendants will continue to admire wildernesses aesthetically, just as it is a considerable assumption that they will continue to enjoy solitude.... We ought... to preserve wildernesses because they may turn out to be useful and because they may afford recreational pleasures, scientific opportunities and aesthetic delight, to our

successors. The first of these considerations . . . is a powerful one, the others less powerful in that they rest upon the presumption that our descendants will still delight in what now delights only some of us and did not delight our predecessors." Passmore, *Man's Responsibility*, pp. 109–10.

16 Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Holmes Rolston, III. *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in Nature* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

17 The issue is apparently what Callicott calls "moral monism." See J. Baird Callicott, "The Case against Moral Pluralism," *Environmental Ethics*, 12 (1990), 99–124. Callicott classifies Christopher Stone and myself, among others, as moral pluralists and cites himself and Holmes Rolston, III as moral monists.

18 William Frankena lists utility values, extrinsic values, contributory values, and perhaps inherent values, and other formulations are possible. William Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

19 Paul W. Taylor, "Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?" pp. 150–1.

20 Ibid., p. 151–2.

21 See Hargrove, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*, pp. 124–9; 165–6; 208–9.

22 See Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism," *Environmental Ethics* 6 (1984), 133–8. Although my remarks here are in the spirit of Norton's paper, we differ concerning the meaning of weak anthropocentrism (personal communication). At the time he wrote this paper, Norton believed that all intrinsic value was nonanthropocentric, a view which he apparently no longer holds (see the introduction to his essay in *The Monist*, 75 (1992), 208–26).

23 I develop this point at great length in my book, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989).

24 Holmes Rolston, III, *Environmental Ethics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 97–104, 169, 186–7, 232–45.

25 Ibid., p. 169.

26 Ibid., 218.

27 Ibid., p. 187. Apparently the claim is that anything that is instrumentally valuable to a holder of intrinsic value, an organism, in some way shares in the intrinsic value of that organism.

28 Ibid., pp. 233–45.

29 J. Baird Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic* (Albany, NJ: SUNY Press, 1989), p. 173.

30 I use the word *uncritical* to describe the claim that humans have intrinsic value because Callicott introduces the claim on the basis of the following sentence: "The intrinsic value of oneself has *for some reason* been taken for granted. . . ." Ibid., p. 172 (emphasis added).

31 I am aware that deep ecologists try to overcome this problem by taking a Spinozistic approach. See George Sessions, "Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature," *Inquiry* 20 (1977), 481–528. I do not, however, see any evidence that Callicott is a Spinozan.

32 Callicott, *In Defense*, p. 147.

33 Ibid., pp. 133–4.

34 See Hargrove, "The Role of Rules," p. 21 and n22, p. 40.

35 See, for example, Anthony Weston, "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics," *Environmental Ethics*, 7 (1985), 321–39, who relies on Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," cited above, and Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism," *Environmental Ethics*, 6 (1984), 131–48. Norton himself (personal communication) backed into pragmatism as a result of the ontological complications of nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, but did not fully embrace pragmatism until he wrote "Conservation and Preservation: A Conceptual Rehabilitation," *Environmental Ethics*, 8 (1986), 195–220. There are, of course, also anti-environmental pragmatic instrumentalists. Passmore, *Man's Responsibility for Nature*, for example, argues that nature preservation can only be supported instrumentally (pp. 101–26), claiming eventually that "whatever exists in nature is of some use to [humans]." He notes that though this claim is not "an empirical hypothesis, for there is no way to falsify it," it is, nevertheless, a useful "guiding principle," which should not be "set aside" (p. 180).

36 Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism." Although Norton leaves open the door for anthropocentric intrinsic value in his paper in this volume, he continues to be preoccupied with his attack on nonanthropocentric intrinsic value.

37 See Nash, *Rights of Nature*. See also F. Fraser Darling, "Man's Responsibility for the Environment," in F. J. Ebling, ed., *Biology and Ethics*, Symposia of the Institute of Biology, no. 18 (London, 1969), p. 119. He writes, "I am not greatly moved when I hear supporters of the national park and nature reserve movement argue that living things have educational value, that the beauties of nature give pleasure to humanity, that they are of scientific value . . . and that we cannot afford to lose them" for "the essential attitude is not far in advance of the timber merchant."

38 For a more detailed discussion, see Eugene C. Hargrove, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp. 124–9.

39 Rolston, *Environmental Ethics*, pp. 16–17, 25–6.

40 For a longer discussion of this matter, see Hargrove, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*, pp. 210–14.

41 While there are undoubtedly millions of people who have sold a piece of land with trees on it, a much smaller number of people have bought or sold a forest. Although forests are apparently bought and sold all the time, I have never had regular contact at any time in my life with anyone who has either bought or sold a forest. I would guess that the number of people who have consciously bought or sold a species is less than one hundred, if that many.

42 Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, p. 133; Rolston, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 233.

43 Rolston, *Environmental Ethics*, p. 120.

44 Ibid., pp. 62–78.

45 Anthropocentrism of this kind has even appeared in the more recent writings of Callicott, who also gives special attention to humans over domestic animals and to domestic animals over wild ones. See Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again," in *In Defense of the Land Ethic*. "Domestic animals are members of the mixed community and ought to enjoy, therefore, all the rights and privileges, whatever they turn out to be, attendant upon that membership. Wild animals are, by definition, not members of the mixed community and therefore should not lie on the same spectrum of graded moral standing as family members, neighbors, fellow citizens, fellow human beings, pets, and other domestic animals" (p. 56). "We are still subject to all the other more particular and individually oriented duties to the members of our various more circumscribed and intimate communities. And *since they are closer to home*, they come first" (p. 58; emphasis added).